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Chapters 11 and 13 of the

Bankruptcy- Code-Observations
on Using Case Authority from
One of the Chapters in
Proceedings Under the Other
David G. Epstein*
ChristopherFuller**
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article will focus on the relationship between Chapter 11
and Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.' A number of issues are
similar or identical in Chapter 11 and Chapter 13. Furthermore,
much of the language of Chapter 13 mirrors that of Chapter 11.
This Article explores whether courts should apply case law and
concepts of one chapter when similar issues arise in proceedings
under the other chapter.
Parts II and III of this Article address basic similarities and
differences between Chapters 11 and 13. Parts IV, V, and VI examine three issues governed by statutory language common to
both chapters. Part IV discusses the discount factor applied in determining present value of deferred cash payments in a Chapter 11
or Chapter 13 plan. Part V analyzes the grounds for relief from an
*Dean, Emory University School of Law, formerly Joseph C. Hutcheson Professor of
Law, University of Texas.
**Associate, Scott, Douglass & Luton; Austin, Texas. The authors wish to acknowledge

the significant editorial assistance provided by the staff of the Vanderbilt Law Review.
1. Title 11 of the United States Code contains the substantive law of bankruptcy. The
statute is divided into eight chapters:
Chapter 1, General Provisions, Definitions and Rules of Construction;

Chapter 3, Case Administration;
Chapter 5, Creditors, the Debtor and the Estate;
Chapter 7, Liquidation;

Chapter 9, Adjustments of the Debt of a Municipality;
Chapter 11, Reorganization;
Chapter 13, Adjustment of the Debts of an Individual with Regular Income; and

Chapter 15, United State Trustees.
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automatic stay. Part VI addresses the classification, under either
chapter, of "substantially similar" claims.
II.

SIMILARITIES BETWEEN CHAPTERS 11 AND

13

There are some obvious similarities between Chapters 11 and
13. For example, the provisions of Chapters 1, 3, and 5 generally
apply in both Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 cases.2 Usually, both
chapters are described as debtor rehabilitation chapters. In the
typical Chapter 11 or 13 case, the debtor retains her assets after
filing a bankruptcy petition. Furthermore, both chapters follow the
same general procedure. The debtor prepares a plan of rehabilitation or repayment. The court reviews the plan. The plan becomes
effective after approval or confirmation by the bankruptcy judge.
Finally, pursuant to this court approved plan, the debtor makes
payments or other distributions to the creditors, usually from her
postpetition earnings.
III.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CHAPTERS

11

AND

13

Some obvious differences distinguish the commencement of a
Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 case. A Chapter 11 case can be voluntary or involuntary. Thus, either a debtor or its creditors can file a
Chapter 11 petition.3 In contrast, every Chapter 13 case is voluntary.4 Thus, a debtor must choose to file for Chapter 13 relief.

Only certain debtors can choose to file under Chapter 13. The
use of Chapter 13 is subject to debt limitations and restricted to
individuals. 5 Partnerships and corporations cannot file for relief
under Chapter 13. Although an individual who is operating a busi-7
ness as a sole proprietorship6 or conducting a professional practice
can fie a Chapter 13 petition, most Chapter 13 debtors are "consumer debtors." In contrast, Chapter 11 is not limited to individuals, partnerships, or corporations. Any "person" is eligible for relief
under Chapter 11. Although a "consumer debtor" can file a Chap2. 11 T.S.C. § 103(a) (1982).
3. Id. §§ 301, 303.
4. Id. § 303(a) ("An involuntary case may be commenced only under Chapter 7 or 11
").
of this title . .
5. Id. § 109(e).
6. See In re Trombley, 34 Bankr. 141 (Banlr. D. Ver. 1983). See generally Moller, It
Isn't Only for Wage EarnersAnymore: The Individual in Business and Chapter13 of the
Bankruptcy Code, 17 Hous. L. REv. 331 (1980).

7. See In re Ballard, 6 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 446 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980); Kaplan,
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: An Attractive Alternative, 28 DE PAUL
L. REV. 1045, 1048 (1979).
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ter 11 petition,8 most Chapter 11 debtors are businesses, farmers,
investors, or professionals.
The differences between Chapters 11 and 13 are not limited to
the commencement of the case. The chapters typically involve different participants. Every Chapter 13 case has a trustee-usually a
standing trustee.9 Generally, there will not be a trustee in a Chapter 11 case. 10 Every Chapter 11 case, however, has a creditors' committee whose statutory duties permit it to "consult with the trustee or debtor in possession concerning the administration of the
case," and "participate in the formulation of the plan.""
When a trustee is appointed in a Chapter 11 case, her duties
are very different from the trustee's duties in a Chapter 13 case. 2
The Chapter 11 trustee takes possession of the property of the estate and operates the business of the debtor. The Chapter 13 trustee does not have this power.' 3 A Chapter 11 trustee also has the
responsibility for the formulation of the reorganization plan. 4 In
5
Chapter 13, only the debtor can file a plan.
The role of creditors in the two chapters also is very different.
As noted above, there is a creditors committee in Chapter 11 that
is involved in both the administration of the case and the formulation of the plan. A Chapter 11 plan is submitted to creditors for
vote.' 6 Chapter 11 creditors can accept or reject the debtor's or
trustee's plan, or submit their own plan. A Chapter 11 plan does
not have to receive the affirmative approval of all or even a majority of all creditors. The requisite majority of at least one class of
creditors, however, must approve the plan in a Chapter 11 case. 17
8. See, e.g., In re Gregory, 39 Bankr. 405 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984); In re Woodhouse,
7 BANKE. CT. DEC. (CRR) 741 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981). But see In re Ponn Realty Trust, 4
Bankr. 226, 231 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980).
9. 11 U.S.C. § 1302 (1982).
10. Id. § 1104. See generally Berdan and Arnold, Displacing the Debtorin Possession:
The Requisites and Advantages of the Appointment of a Trustee in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 67 MARQ. L. REv. 457 (1984).
11. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1102, 1103(c)(1), (3) (1982), amended by Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat.
333 (1984). See generally Blain and Erne, Creditors' Committees Under Chapter 11 of the
United States Bankruptcy Code: Creation, Composition,Powers and Duties, 67 MARQ. L.
Rav. 491 (1984).
12. Compare 11 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1106, 1108 (1982) with id. § 1302. See generally Peeples, Five into Thirteen: Lien Avoidance in Chapter 13, 61 N.C. L. REv. 849, 868-71 (1983)
(discussing a Chapter 13 trustee's avoidance powers).
13. 11 U.S.C. § 1302(c) (1982).
14. Id. § 1106(a)(5).
15. Id. § 1321.
16. Id. §§ 1125, 1126, as amended by Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
17. Id. § 1129, as amended by Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
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In contrast, Chapter 13 provides no creditors' committee, no creditors' vote, and no possibility for a creditors' plan."8
While both Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 require that the judge
approve the plan, some of the confirmation standards are different.19 Furthermore, the effect of confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan
is different from the effect of confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan. In
Chapter 11, confirmation effects a discharge.2" This discharge
means that when the court approves the Chapter 11 plan, the
debtor's obligations on his prepetition debts are limited to what
was called for by the plan. Confirmation in a Chapter 11 case also
simultaneously terminates the automatic stay.2 ' Confirmation of a
Chapter 13 plan does not automatically terminate the stay. Chapter 13 does not allow a discharge until the debtor completes her
payments under the plan or receives a hardship discharge.2"
Finally, there are differences between a Chapter 11 and a
Chapter 13 discharge. An individual debtor's Chapter 13 discharge
is more comprehensive than a Chapter 11 discharge. A Chapter 11
23
discharge is subject to all the exceptions set out in section 523(a).
On the other hand, if a Chapter 13 debtor completes the payments
called for by her plan, the discharge will be subject only to the
section 523(a)(5) exception for family obligations.2 4
18. Id. §§ 1324, 1325, as amended by Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
19. Id. §§ 1129, 1325. For example, Chapter 13 requires that the plan either provide
for full payment of all unsecured claims or commit all of the debtor's "disposable income"
to the plan. Chapter 11 contains no comparable test. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 317, 98 Stat. 333, 356 (to be codified at 11
U.S.C. § 1325(b)); see infra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
20. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) (1982).
21. Id. § 362(c)(2)(C).
22. Id. § 1328. While confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan does not effect a termination
of the automatic stay, it does affect the grounds for relief from the stay. Courts have held
that confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan prevents the use of § 362(d)(2) and limits "cause"
for purposes of § 362(d)(1) to matters occurring after the confirmation. See, e.g., In re
Clark, 38 Bankr. 683 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); In re Lewis, 8 Bankr. 132 (Bankr. D. Idaho
1981). The reasoning supporting these holdings is that the plain language of § 1327(a) vitiates the applicability of § 362(d)(2). See Clark, 38 Bankr. at 684; Lewis, 8 Bankr. at 136-37.
Section 1327 states: "The provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor and each creditor,
whether or not the claim of such creditor is provided for by the plan, and whether or not
such creditor has objected to, has accepted, or has rejected the plan." 11 U.S.C. § 1327(a)
(1982).
23. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(2) (1982); see Lander, An Analysis and Comparison of the
NondischargeabilityProvisions of Chapter 11 and Chapter13 of the Bankruptcy Code, 27
ST. Louis U. L.J. 639, 643 (1983).
24. Defalcation claims, educational obligations, and other debts excepted from discharge by § 523 will still be discharged under § 1328. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (1982), as
amended by Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
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Though this section of the Article has listed many differences
between Chapters 11 and 13-differences that may profoundly affect the rehabilitation process-the case authority from one chapter still offers some precedential value to like issues arising in proceedings under the other chapter. The rest of this Article examines
the applicability of this precedent as well as the inherent limits on
its applicability.
IV.

THE RATE OF INTEREST REQUIRED BY "VALUE, AS OF THE
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE PLAN"

In both Chapter 11 and Chapter 13, the plan can provide for
periodic payments. Chapter 13 plans generally provide for payments over a three year period. The court, however, can approve a
Chapter 13 plan that has a five year payment period.2 5 There is no
statutory limitation on the payment period of a Chapter 11 plan:
both three and five year plans are common.
Obviously, payment of X dollars over a three to five year period is less valuable to a creditor than an immediate cash payment
of X dollars. Accordingly, both section 1129 of Chapter 11 and section 1325 of Chapter 13 test the adequacy of a plan's deferred cash
payments to the holder of a secured claim by looking to the "value,
as of the effective date of the plan" of the deferred cash payments.
The statutory language is exactly the same in both chapters.2 8
Most of the reported cases interpreting this phrase have arisen
under Chapter 13. Should a court look to and rely on these Chapter 13 present value cases in determining whether a Chapter 11
plan meets the present value test of section 1129?
Recently, a bankruptcy court in Utah considered that general
question at length in In re Loveridge Machine & Tool Co. 27 In
Loveridge, the Chapter 11 debtors owed Northwest, a trade creditor, $448,807. The contract creating the debt provided for nineteen
percent interest. Northwest's claim was secured by equipment, inventory, and accounts. The parties agreed that the collateral's
value was greater than the amount of Northwest's claim. Debtors
and Northwest, however, did not agree on how debtors' Chapter 11
plan should treat Northwest's secured claim. The plan classified
Northwest's claim in a separate class28 and proposed to pay North25. Id. § 1322(c).
26. Compare id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(ll) with id. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).
27. 36 Bankr. 159, 168-69 (Bankr. D. Utah 1983).
28. For a discussion of the relationship between Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 on classification, see infra notes 84-120 and accompanying text.
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west the full amount of its secured claim, including legal fees and
interest, over a six to seven year period. Northwest disagreed only
with the plan's proposed interest rate on its fully secured claim.
The interest rate was to be measured by "the Legal Rate as defined in 28 USC Section 1961."
To confirm the plan over Northwest's dissent, bankruptcy
Judge Glen Clark had to determine whether paying interest at a
rate measured by 28 USC section 1961(a) met the "value, as of the
effective date of the plan" test of section 1129(b). 28 USC section
1961(a) governs the interest rate of money judgments in federal
civil cases. 29 A number of bankruptcy cases have held that a plan
providing for posteffective date interest at a rate tied to 28 USC
section 1961(a) satisfies the "value, as of the effective date of the
plan" test.3 0 Most of these cases are Chapter 13 cases.
The Loveridge court rejected these precedents and denied the
debtors' motion for confirmation. Judge Clark questioned the applicability of the present value analysis in Chapter 13 cases to the
consideration of the proper discount rate for deferred payments to
an objecting holder of a secured claim under a Chapter 11 plan.
The Loveridge opinion set out several differences between Chapter
11 and Chapter 13 to justify reading the phrase "value, as of the
effective date of the plan" differently in Chapter 11 cases than in
Chapter 13 cases.
A.

Statutory Language

The Loveridge court first noted that section 1129(b)(1) has a
"fair and equitable" rule while section 1325(a)(5) does not. The
court stated that "[tihis unique Chapter 11 requirement may, in
some cases, dictate interest rates different from those which would
be applied in a pure present value analysis."3'1 The court provided
no support for this statement, and the authors are unable to find
any. The phrase "fair and equitable" has a long bankruptcy history. The standard was used in Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898 and was construed as requiring absolute priority among
classes of claims and interests according to their ranks.32 Courts
29. Interest is based on treasury bill rates. The Director of the Administrative Office
of United States Courts distributes notices of the prevailing rates to federal judges.
30. E.g., In re Connecticut Aerosols, Inc., 31 Bankr. 883 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983)
(Chapter 11 case); In re Jewel, 25 Bankr. 44 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982) (Chapter 13 case).
31. 36 Bankr. at 168.
32. See, e.g., Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); Northern
Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913); see also 5 COLLmR ON BANKRuPTcY 11129.03[2] (L.
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and commentators generally describe the fair and equitable standard as an absolute priority rule. Under this description, Loveridges' Chapter 11 plan was fair and equitable respecting Northwest's secured claim if Northwest was to be paid in full before
unsecured creditors and other junior classes of claims and interests
received anything.
Although the phrase "fair and equitable" controls the order in
which claims are paid, it would not seem to affect the rate of posteffective date interest as the Loveridge Court suggested. Therefore,
the "fair and equitable' component in Chapter 11 would not seem
to justify interpreting "value, as of the effective date of the plan"
differently in Chapter 11 cases than in Chapter 13 cases.
B. Risks of Nonpayment
The Loveridge court's second reason for discounting Chapter
13 case authority on interest rates in applying section 1129(b) is
that the "risk of nonpayment in Chapter 13 [is] significantly different from the risk of nonpayment in Chapter 11."- 3 As Judge Clark
points out, in Chapter 13 a standing trustee is statutorily obligated
to collect and disburse payments.3 4 In most Chapter 11 cases, there
is no trustee. Furthermore, "Chapter 13 debtors who complete
their plans receive a broader discharge than individual debtors in
Chapter 11."15 Because of this more comprehensive discharge,
Chapter 13 debtors have a greater incentive than Chapter 11 debtors to complete their payments. No meaningful empirical studies
compare the risks of nonpayment faced by holders of secured
claims in Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 cases. The legal factors considered in Loveridge suggest that Chapter 13 may present lower
risks. Other legal factors, however, suggest that Chapter 11
presents lower risks. If a Chapter 11 debtor fails to make payments
under a Chapter 11 plan, the affected creditors can bring collection
actions in any federal or state court with jurisdiction. Since the
confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan effects a discharge, the automatic stay automatically terminates as soon as a Chapter 11 plan is
confirmed.36 The debtor's failure to make payments under a Chapter 13 plan has different consequences. Before bringing the collecKing 15th ed. 1984).
33. 36 Bankr. at 168.
34. 11 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(5) (1982), as amended by Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333

(1984).
35.
36.

36 Bankr. at 168; see also supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(C) (1982).
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tion action in a Chapter 13 case, the affected creditors must file a
motion with the bankruptcy court to obtain relief from the automatic stay.3
Dean Nimmer of the University of Houston Law Center suggests another reason that creditors have lower risks in business
Chapter 11 cases than in consumer Chapter 13 cases: "In both
cases, the sole bankruptcy alternative is a Chapter 7 liquidation.
For businesses, however, liquidation terminates the effective existence of the entity and sacrifices perceived opportunities to salvage
going concern value from assets. In contrast, an individual remains
a functioning economic unit after liquidation.""8 Thus, the Chapter
11 business debtor may be less likely to convert from rehabilitation
to liquidation with the attendant possibility that the creditor will
get less.
C.

Tax Cases

The Loveridge court noted that "most of the Chapter 13 opinions [on interest rates] deal with creditors secured by liens on cars
or tax creditors."3 9 The court was right to distinguish Chapter 13
tax cases from Loveridge. The Internal Revenue Service and other
taxing authorities are not bound by the same constraints or motivated by the same goals as private creditors. Therefore, tax cases
should not be controlling precedent against nontax creditors like
Northwestern.
Section 1129 implicitly recognizes the special nature of tax
claims. Section 1129(a)(9)(C) separately deals with tax claims.
While section 1129(a)(9)(C), like section 1129(b), contains the
phrase "values as of the effective date of the plan," cases under
section 1129(a)(9)(C) have little precedential value to cases under
section 1129(b). Similarly, Chapter 13 cases applying section
1325(a)(5) to tax claims should not be controlling in either Chapter
11 or Chapter 13 cases involving nontax claims.40
37. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
38. See Nimmer, Real Estate Creditors and the Automatic Stay: A Study in Behavioral Economics, 1983 ARIz. ST. L.J. 281.
39. 36 Bankr. at 168.
40. In bankruptcy cases, the Internal Revenue Service has been vigilant and reasonably successful in demanding a present value discount based on § 6621 of the Internal Revenue Code, which governs the interest charge on delinquent taxes. See, e.g., In re Fi-Hi
Pizza, Inc., 40 Bankr. 258 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (Chapter 11 proceeding); In re Stafford,
24 Bankr. 840 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982). Nonetheless, perhaps § 6621 should not be used in
bankruptcy to determine the "value, as of the effective date of the plan" of tax claims. In re
Fisher, 29 Bankr. 542 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983), makes a strong argument against such use:
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D.

Uniform Interest Rate for All Cases

The Loveridge court's final reason for not following Chapter
13 case law on "value, as of the effective date of the plan" is that
many Chapter 13 cases on "value, as of the effective date of the
plan" attempt to set a uniform interest rate to be applied in all
cases.," Because of the $350,000 secured debt limit imposed by section 109(e), Chapter 13 cases will always involve relatively small
dollar amounts. For reasons of administrative convenience and financial necessity, many jurisdictions use a uniform interest rate in
applying section 1325(a)(5).4 2 Courts that utilize this constant rate
make little or no distinction between the types of claims or the
feasibility of the proposed plan.
Whether this uniform rate approach is appropriate even in
Chapter 13 cases is questionable. The risks that a creditor incurs
in waiting for payment should be a factor in determining whether
the proposed periodic payments have a "value, as of the effective
date of the plan" of the allowed amount of such claim. Although
plans must meet feasibility standards, thus signifying that the
bankruptcy court has determined that the plan likely will succeed,
"some plans are more feasible than others. 4 Therefore, even a
Chapter 13 court should build the secured creditors' risks of loss
into interest rate determinations on a case by case basis.
While considerations of convenience and economy might,
nonetheless, offer some justifications for disregarding differences in
creditor risk in some Chapter 13 cases, they are not applicable in
most Chapter 11 cases. A Chapter 11 case can involve creditors
with single secured claims far larger than the total amount of secured claims permitted in Chapter 13. Chapter 11's requirements
of creditors' committees and creditors' voting on plans also indicate that considerations of convenience and economy are less compelling in Chapter 11 than in Chapter 13.
Judge Clark in Loveridge concluded his comparison of Chapter 13 cases on "value, as of the effective date of the plan" with
The IRS does not set its section 6621 rate of interest based on any of the advocated
factors such as duration, collateral, and risk of default. The IRS has determined that
its rate of interest must be high enough to deter tax evasion, restrict creative tax avoidance, and to compel timely tax payment and reporting.
Id. at 545.
41. 36 Bankr. at 168.
42. See, e.g., In re Jewel, 25 Bankr. 44 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982); In re Johnson, 8 Bankr.
503 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1981).
43. See In re Fi-Hi Pizza, Inc., 40 Bankr. 258, 271 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:901

Chapter 11 cases by stating: "The Chapter 13 opinions are not the
last word on present value issues in Chapter 11 cases. Put simply,
the Chapter 13 opinions should not inspire courts to avoid hard
thinking about present value issues in Chapter 11 cases."44 While
the Loveridge opinion provides support for this statement, it also
provides support for the statement that Chapter 13 opinions are
not the last word on present value issues in Chapter 13 cases. The
present Chapter 13 opinions should not prevent courts from hard
thinking about present value in Chapter 13 cases. Many of the reasons that the Loveridge court gave for not following Chapter 13
present value cases in Chapter 11 cases undercut the validity of
the court's assumptions about Chapter 13, not the applicability of
an approach that is valid in Chapter 13 cases to Chapter 11 cases.
V.

GROUNDS FOR RELIEF FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY IN CHAPTERS

11 AND 13
The filing of any bankruptcy petition-Chapters 7, 11, or
13-triggers the automatic stay of section 362. Under section 362,
a creditor is barred from proceeding against the debtor or its collateral without first obtaining permission from the bankruptcy
court.
An important factor in assessing the impact of the automatic
stay on a creditor is the time period that the automatic stay is in
effect. Section 362(c)(2)(C) provides that the automatic stay automatically terminates when a discharge is granted. Thus, in a Chapter 11 case, the automatic stay ends when the plan is confirmed
because confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan effects a discharge. Confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan, on the other hand, does not have
this effect. Because the confirmation does not result in a discharge,
it does not automatically terminate the automatic stay.
Frequently, in a Chapter 11 case, a year or two will pass between the filing of the bankruptcy petition and the confirmation of
the plan. During this time period, the automatic stay bars the
creditor from pursuing the debtor on prepetition obligations, and
the debtor has no commitments to pay the creditor under the plan
because it is not yet in place. Furthermore, the creditor cannot
draw interest on its claim unless the value of the collateral securing its claim is greater than the amount of its debt. Except for the
provision in section 506(b) for the over-secured creditor, the running of interest stops when the petition is filed.
44.

36 Bankr. at 168.
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In a Chapter 13 case, it would be very unusual for a year to
pass between the filing of the petition and confirmation of the
plan. A Chapter 13 plan must be filed within fifteen days after the
filing of the bankruptcy petition. In Chapter 13, unlike Chapter 11,
the plan is not voted on by creditors. The delays in confirmation of
a Chapter 13 plan are usually caused by the caseload of the court.
An aggrieved creditor can file a motion with the bankruptcy
court requesting relief from the automatic stay. The relief can take
the form of an end to the automatic stay or the imposition of conditions or restrictions on the continuation of the automatic stay.
Section 362(d) sets out the grounds for this relief. The language of
section 362(d) is the statutory language that controls motions for
relief from the automatic stay in both Chapter 11 and Chapter 13
cases. While the statutory language is the same, whether courts
should interpret the language of section 362(d) similarly in Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 cases is open to question.
A.

Section 362(d)(1)

Section 362(d)(1) provides for relief from the automatic stay
"for cause." "Cause" is not statutorily defined. The statute does,
however, provide an example of "cause": "the lack of adequate
'45
protection of an interest in property of such party in interest.
Many Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 cases have applied this language
to requests for relief from stay by creditors with secured claims.
That the adequate protection requirement is directed to a secured
creditor's interest in its collateral, not its interest in the repayment
of the underlying debt now seems well settled. 0 It is not, however,
well settled what interest in the collateral is to be adequately protected, or what is required to adequately protect that interest.
Some of the leading cases addressing these issues concern Chapter
11. The question here considered is the extent to which this Chapter 11 case law should be followed in Chapter 13 cases concerning
section 362(d)(1).
45.

11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (1982).

46. Assume, for example, that D, who is now in bankruptcy, owes C $320,000 and this
$320,000 debt is secured by equipment with a value of $110,000. Section 362(d)(1) requires
adequate protection of C's interest in the $110,000 of collateral, but does not protect C's
right of repayment of the $320,000 debt.
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1. Opportunity Costs
A number of recent Chapter 11 cases have considered whether
adequate protection includes compensation for lost opportunity
costs. 47 Assume, for example, that D owes C $370,000 and the debt
is secured by collateral with a stable value of $110,000. C argues
that, but for bankruptcy and the automatic stay, it would: (i) foreclose on its collateral, (ii) sell the collateral for $110,000, (iii) reinvest the $110,000 of proceeds, and (iv) earn and be paid interest on
the $110,000. C thus contends that one of the costs of the stay is
this lost opportunity, and that its rights in the collateral are not
being adequately protected unless it is compensated for this loss.
Most of the bankruptcy courts that have considered such arguments have rejected them. 48 Recently, however, the Ninth Circuit became the first circuit court to consider the opportunity cost
issue. The Ninth Circuit held in In re American Mariner Industries, Inc. 49 that adequate protection does include compensation
for lost opportunities. The case involved facts very similar to those
outlined in the above hypothetical: a Chapter 11 debtor and a partially secured creditor whose "collateral was not depreciating." 50
The creditor claimed that its interest in the collateral would be
adequately protected as contemplated by section 362(d)(1) only if
it received periodic payments equal to its prospective return from
47. See, e.g., In re American Mariner Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984) (in
favor of the requirement); In re Aegean Fare, Inc., 34 Bankr. 965 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983)
(rejecting the requirement); In re Shriver, 33 Bankr. 176 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983) (rejecting); In re Pine Lake Village Apartments Co., 19 Bankr. 819 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(rejecting); In re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 Bankr. 803 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (rejecting);
In re Virginia Foundry Co., 9 Bankr. 493 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1981) (granting such protection).
48. See In re Cantrup, 32 Bankr. 1004, 1005 (Bankr. Colo. 1983).
49. 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984).
50. Id. at 428. In American Mariner, Crocker National Bank was an undersecured
creditor with a debt of $370,000 secured by $110,000 of collateral. Crocker moved for adequate protection after American Mariner filed its petition. Crocker alleged that, because it
had a state law right to seize and sell the collateral, the automatic stay prevented it from
earning interest on the proceeds of the sale of collateral. The bankruptcy court found that
the collateral was not depreciating and was necessary for an effective reorganization. A divided bankruptcy appellate panel affirmed the lower court's rejection of adequate protection
for lost opportunity costs. 27 Bankr. 1004 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983). The debtor had offered to
pay "interest on the value of the collateral" of $1770 per month. The bankruptcy court
conditioned the continuation of the stay on such payment, stating: "Although I hold that no
interest is due and although no evidence of economic depreciation has been presented, I find
that the $1770 per month is adequate protection for any depreciation or depletion of the
collateral that may occur." In re American Mariner Indus., Inc., 10 Bankr. 711, 714 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1981). Crocker appealed. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case with orders that
the debtor structure some proposal that would adequately protect Crocker's interest. In re
American Mariner Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 426, 435 (9th Cir. 1984).
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the reinvestment of the liquidation value of the collateral. Both
52
the bankruptcy court51 and a divided bankruptcy appellate panel
rejected this contention. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the creditor is "entitled to compensation for
the delay in enforcing its rights during theS interim between the
1
petition and the confirmation of the plan. 5

In reaching this holding, the Ninth Circuit considered: (i) the
phrase "indubitable equivalent," which appears in section 361(3)'s
list of examples of adequate protection; (ii) Judge Hand's opinion
using the language "indubitable equivalence" to define adequate
protection in In re Murel Holding Corp.,54 a case under section
77B of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898; (iii) the use of the phrase "indubitable equivalent" in section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii); and (iv) bankruptcy court decisions rejecting opportunity costs arguments in
Chapter 11 cases.5 5 The Ninth Circuit's opinion in American Mariner does not mention Chapter 13 or consider Chapter 13
5
authority.
51. 10 Bankr. 711 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981).
52. 27 Bankr. 1004 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983).
53. 734 F.2d at 435.
54. 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935) (Hand, J.).
Murel concerned a proposed plan for repaying the mortgagee of an apartment house.
The debtors' plan proposed that the mortgagee forego amortization payments and extend
the due date of the mortgage while the debtors renovated the apartment house to make it
more readily leasable. After the mortgagee rejected the plan, the court had to decide
whether or not the owner's plan provided adequate protection before the court could confirm the plan over the mortgagee's objection. Judge Hand explained the concept of adequate
protection:
It is plain that "adequate protection" must be completely compensatory; and that payment ten years hence is not generally the equivalent of payment now. Interest is indeed
the common measure of the difference, but a creditor who fears the safety of his principal will scarcely be content with that; he wishes to get his money or at least the property. We see no reason to suppose that the statute was intended to deprive him of that
in the interest of junior holders, unless by substitute of the most ihdubitable
equivalence.
Id. at 942 (emphasis added). The Murel court rejected the plan because it determined that
the plan had little hope of success and thus did not afford the mortgagee adequate protection. Id. at 943.
Judge Hand's explanation of "adequate protection" was given new significance by congressional reports indicating that "[t]he indubitable equivalent language is intended to follow the strict approach taken by Judge Learned Hand in In re Murel Holding Corp., 75
F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935)." S. REP.No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 127, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5913.
55. See supra note 47.
56. Consider the consequences of applying the American Mariner rule to the most
common Chapter 13 adequate protection fact situation. D, the Chapter 13 debtor, owes C
$10,000 on her car note. C has a perfected security interest in D's car. The car has a value of
$6000 and this value is declining at a rate of $300. C files a motion requesting relief from the
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Since the American Mariner decision was decided on June 4,
1984, several Chapter 11 cases have relied on American Mariner to
hold that when the automatic stay prevents a creditor from repossessing its collateral, the creditor is entitled, under the concept of
adequate protection, to compensation for this delay in enforcing its
rights. 57 At least one Chapter 11 case has expressly rejected Ameri5 8 To date, no reported Chapter 13 case has considcan Mariner.
ered American Mariner.
Is there any reason to limit American Mariner to Chapter 11
cases? The Ninth Circuit looked to the "indubitable equivalent"
language in section 361(3) in interpreting the phrase "adequate
protection" in section 362(d)(1). Section 361(3), like section
362(d)(1), applies in Chapter 13 cases as well as Chapter 11 cases.
The argument that American Marinershould not be followed
in either Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 cases is easier to make than the
argument that American Mariner should be followed only in
Chapter 11 cases. A first difficulty American Marinerpresents lies
in distinguishing "opportunity costs" from postpetition interest.
Arguably, American Mariner creates a conflict with section
506(b)'s dictate that only fully secured claims accrue interest during the period between the filing of the petition and the confirmation of the plan. 59
How is opportunity costs compensation different from interest? While the American Mariner opinion avoids using the term
"interest," it acknowledges that "monthly interest payments at the
market rate on the liquidation value of the collateral" is a permissible form of adequate protection for opportunity costs. ° A later
opportunity costs decision, Grundy National Bank v. Tandem
Mining Corp.,"' is more direct. It relies on American Mariner to
hold that a creditor is entitled to interest.2
A second problem that American Marinercreates is the possistay. Under American Mariner,D would have to make periodic payments to C to cover the
depreciation on the car and provide compensation for lost opportunity costs in order to
satisfy the adequate protection standard of § 362(d)(1).
57. See, e.g., Grundy Nat'l Bank v. Tandem Mining Corp., 754 F.2d 1436 (4th Cir.
1985); In re Mary Harpley Builder, Inc., 44 Bankr. 151 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984).
58. BANK& L. REP. (CCH) 1 70,139 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984).
59. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1982). But cf. Note, Compensation for Time Value as Part of
Adequate Protection During the Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 50 U. CHL L. REV. 305,
321-22 (1983) (arguing that § 506(b) does not affect the right of undersecured creditors to
adequate protection).
60. 734 F.2d at 435.
61. 754 F.2d 1436 (4th Cir. 1985).
62. Id. at 1441.
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bility that a creditor that is only partially secured will be treated
more favorably than a creditor that is fully secured. Under American Mariner,a creditor whose debt is partially secured is entitled
to periodic payments to cover lost opportunity costs. Under section
506(b), the fully secured creditor's claim will accrue postpetition
interest, but the fully secured creditor will not immediately receive
this postpetition interest. Section 506(b) does not contemplate that
holders of fully secured claims will be paid X dollars each month.
Instead, the fully secured creditor's claim will increase by X dollars each month.
Does American Mariner contemplate that fully secured creditors also must receive opportunity cost payments as a part of adequate protection? Has a creditor whose claim is continuing to draw
interest been deprived of an opportunity cost? At least one postAmerican Mariner decision from a bankruptcy court in the Ninth
Circuit has answered the latter question in the negative and denied
the opportunity cost claim of a fully secured creditor.63 This holding means that a partially secured creditor, but not a fully secured
creditor, can demand periodic payments as a condition to the continuation of the automatic stay.
2. Role of the Bankruptcy Judge in Adequate Protection Litigation
Neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the Bankruptcy Rules specifically describe the role that the bankruptcy judge is to play in
section 362(d)(1) litigation in which the issue is whether the creditor seeking relief from the automatic stay is adequately protected.
There is, however, some relevant legislative history. Both the
House report and the Senate report accompanying the bills that
became the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 state that the Bankruptcy Code does not require courts to provide an adequate protection proposal. The court's role is only to determine whether the
trustee's or debtor's proposal meets the "adequate protection"
standard."
63. See In re Sun Valley Ranches, Inc., 43 Bankr. 641 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1984) (Williams, Mag.). In Sun Valley Ranches, the creditor's first petition for relief was denied on the
basis of the bankruptcy apellate panel's decision in American Mariner, which the Ninth
Circuit reversed.
The Sun Valley court denied the opportunity cost claim because it reasoned that a
fully secured creditor with an equity cushion is already adequately protected. The court
concluded that American Mariner intended to provide only the undersecured creditor with

adequate protection similar to that given to fully secured creditors under § 506(b).
64.

H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 338, reprintedin 1978 U.S.

AD. NEws 5963, 6295. The House Report provides:

CODE CONG.

&
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Unfortunately, the legislative reports do not indicate what
should happen if the court decides that the protection provided is
not adequate. What if, for example, a Chapter 11 or Chapter 13
debtor proposes monthly payments of X dollars to cover the depreciation of a creditor's collateral, but the bankruptcy court decides that X dollars is not adequate? Should the bankruptcy court
terminate the automatic stay or condition the continuation of the
automatic stay on payments in an amount that the court deems
adequate?
Recently, in In re Irving A. Horns Farms, Inc.,6 5 a Chapter 11
case, the bankruptcy court answered this question by granting the
motion to lift the stay and stating: "It is not the Court's duty to
fashion adequate protection."66 In Horns the debtor did not make
a specific adequate protection proposal; in other words, the debtor
never offered any additional collateral or payments to compensate
for the decreasing value of the creditor's interest in the debtor's
property. Perhaps a court will be more willing to modify a debtor's
adequate protection proposal. Indeed, a Utah bankruptcy court in
In re Alyucan Interstate Corp.67 relied on the word "modify" to
suggest a more active role for the bankruptcy judge in section
362(d)(1) litigation. The Alyucan court concluded: "This result
[courts actively fashioning protection for creditors] may be inevitable given the exigencies and informalities of relief from stay proceedings. Indeed it grows out of the language of section 362(d)
which mandates relief such as 'modifying or conditioning' the
68
stay."
A number of arguments support the proposition that, at least
in Chapter 13 cases, the bankruptcy court should take a more active role in adequate protection litigation. The differences in dollar
amounts at stake suggest that often there will be differences in the
quantity and quality of debtor representation in Chapter 11 and
This section [section 361] specifies the means by which adequate protection may be
provided. . . .[but, to avoid] plac[ing] the court in an administrative role[,]. . . does
not require the court to provide it. . . .Instead, the trustee or debtor in possession [or
the creditor] will provide or propose a protection method. If the party that is affected
by the proposed action objects, the court will determine whether the protection provided is adequate.

Id.
65. 42 Bankr. 832 (Bankr. D. Iowa 1984).
66. Id. at 838.
67. 12 Bankr. 803 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
68. Id. at 809 n.12; see also In re Pleasant Valley, Inc., 6 Bankr. 13, 17-18 (Bankr D.
Nev. 1980) (court provided a number of specific terms and conditions for the debtor to meet
in satisfying the "adequate protection" standard).
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Chapter 13 cases. Should a Chapter 13 debtor lose her car because
the general practitioner representing her is unaware that American
Mariner means that adequate protection payments must cover
both depreciation and opportunity costs even though the debtor is
able and willing to make such payments? Moreover, the Bankruptcy Code suggests that the court take a more active role in
Chapter 13 cases: a Chapter 11 plan is reviewed and passed on by
both creditors and the bankruptcy court, but a Chapter 13 plan is
reviewed and passed on only by the bankruptcy judge.
B. Section 362(d)(2)
Section 362(d)(2) provides an alternative basis for relief from
the automatic stay. A secured creditor is entitled to relief from the
stay if it can either establish "cause" under section 362(d)(1) or
satisfy the requirements of section 362(d)(2)."9 The issues under
section 362(d)(2) are whether the debtor has any equity in the encumbered property and whether the encumbered property is "necessary to an effective reorganization."
1. Applicability of Section 362(d)(2) in Chapter 13 Cases
No court has questioned whether section 362(d)(1) applies in
Chapter 13 cases. Several courts, however, have refused to apply
section 362(d)(2) in Chapter 13 cases. 70 In refusing to apply section
362(d)(2) in Chapter 13 cases, the courts have looked to the word
"reorganization" in section 362(d)(2)(B). "Reorganization" is the
term used for the title of Chapter 11. While there can be a rehabilitation or debt adjustment in Chapter 13, there cannot be "reorganization." These courts thus have reasoned that section
362(d)(2) only applies in Chapter 11 cases.
Legislative history also provides some support for the view
that section 362(d)(2) does not apply in Chapter 13 cases.7 2 This
subsection was inserted by the Senate during its deliberations on
69. See, e.g., In re Mellor, 734 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1984); In re Million, 39 Bankr. 136
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984). But cf. In re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 Bankr. 803, 811 n.17
(Bankr. Utah 1981).
70. See, e.g., In re Youngs, 7 Bankr. 69 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980); In re Feimster, 3
Bankr. 11 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1979).
71. See Youngs, 7 Bankr. at 69; Feimster, 3 Bankr. at 11.
72. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 53, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5787, 5839. There is also some postenactment legislative history. Richard Levin, "a
principal drafter of the Code," has indicated that § 3612(d)(2) should apply only in Chapter
11 cases. Comment, Home Foreclosures Under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act,
30 UCLA L. REv. 637, 648 no. 65-66 (1983).
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the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. As originally drafted, section
362(d)(2) stated, "property is not necessary to an effective reorganization of the debtor if it is real property in which no business is
being conducted by the debtor other than the business of operating the real property and the activities incident thereto. 7 3 This
draft suggests that Congress was concerned about business cases.
Because Chapter 13 cases normally do not involve businesses, it
can be argued that this draft implies that Congress did not intend
section 362(d)(2) to apply to Chapter 13.
Notwithstanding the statutory language, the legislative history, and the problems of applying the statute, 4 the majority view
is that section 362(d)(2) does apply to Chapter 13 cases. 7 5 The majority view cases have relied primarily on section 103(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code, which makes all of Chapter 3 applicable in
Chapter 13 cases.71
2.

What is "Necessary"

As previously mentioned, before granting relief from the automatic stay under section 362(d)(2), the court must determine that
the property at issue is not "necessary" to an effective reorganization. "Necessary" is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code and may
have a different meaning in Chapter 11 cases than it has in Chapter 13 cases. The rest of this section explores the foundation of
these different meanings.
Assume that ACME, Inc., filed a Chapter 11 petition. At the
time of the filing, the airline had sixty-six planes. S, a creditor with
73. Id. (emphasis added).
At least one bankruptcy court has based its conclusion that § 362(d)(2)(B) has no application to Chapter 13 cases on policy grounds. In re Garner, 13 Bankr. 799 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1981). The bankruptcy court reasoned that because § 362(g) shifts the burden of proof to
the debtor on the issue of the property's necessity and because the debtor rarely could prove
the necessity of nonincome producing property, applying § 362(d)(2) conflicts with the remedial purpose of Chapter 13. In reversing this holding in In re Garner, 18 Bankr. 369, 37071 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), the district court stated that the "necessary to an effective reorganization" standard must have an entirely different meaning in rehabilitation cases. The district
court found that the "stay against foreclosure on residential property might be lifted where
the debtor's present assets or prospects and the plan would not suffer materially." Id. at
371; see also Nimmer, Real Estate Creditors and the Automatic Stay: A Study in Behavioral Economics, 1983 ARiz. ST. L.J. 281, 320 (noting the problems in applying the "necessary" standard to residential property).
74. See supra note 73.
75. See, e.g., In re Mellor, 734 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1984); In re Million, 39 Bankr. 136
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984); see also H. SOMMER, CONSUMER BANKRuPrcy LAW AND PRACTICE 5556 (1982).
76. 11 U.S.C. § 103 (1982); see In re Garner, 18 Bankr. 369, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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a lien on seven of the planes, files a motion requesting relief from
the stay under section 362(d)(2). Should the bankruptcy court
wrestle with the question of whether ACME needs all sixty-six
planes, in other words, whether it can reorganize with only fiftynine planes?
To date, bankruptcy courts have not dealt with such questions
in reported Chapter 11 cases. Instead, the courts seem to assume
that a Chapter 11 debtor has discretion in choosing which property
to use in its reorganization effort. Consider, for example, In re
Mickler,1 a Chapter 11 case involving a request to lift the stay on
raw land that the debtor occasionally used for farming and cattle
grazing. In denying the creditor's motion, the court stated:
Although the Court is not overly persuaded by the Debtors' need to use the
subject property... the Court is persuaded that ... the Debtors should be

able to select the assets that should be sold and which to retain so long as the
rights of the parties are not significantly impaired and their interest is adequately protected.7 8

Other courts have suggested that, in business reorganization cases,
"necessary" simply means income producing or income related.79
Under this latter test, a creditor with a lien on one of ACME's
planes could obtain relief from the stay under section 362(d)(2)
only for those planes that ACME is not using.
Another issue bankruptcy courts must address in Chapter 11
section 362(d)(2) litigation is whether section 1121(b) requires that
the court delay 120 days before making any 362(d)(2) determinations. Under section 1121(b), only the debtor can file a plan during
the first 120 days of the Chapter 11 case. An early judicial determination that property is not necessary to an effective reorganization
would seem inconsistent with this period of exclusivity.
Bankruptcy courts have been willing to question a Chapter 13
consumer debtor's claim that encumbered property is necessary.
For example, in In re Jones,80 the court granted Chrysler Credit
Corporation's motion to lift the stay so that it could reposses the
debtor's 1976 Chevrolet Monte Carlo. The debtor owed $2546 to
Chrysler on the car, which had a value of $1500 to $1800. The
court concluded that the debtor had failed to show that the automobile was necessary "having found that public transportation and
77.
78.
79.
ers, Inc.,
80.

13 Bankr. 631 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981).
Id. at 633.
See, e.g., In re Kane, 27 Bankr. 902 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1983); In re Classics Print24 Bankr. 24 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).
7 Bankr. 141 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980).
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his stepfather's automobile are available to Debtor."" l
Most of the reported Chapter 13 cases under section 362(d)(2)
involve home mortgages.8 s In some of these cases, the courts analyzed "necessary" by determining whether the property is essential
to the debtor's production of income. These courts concluded that
a house used solely as a residence is never necessary.8 3 Other courts
summarily conclude that, so long as the house is used as the
debtor's residence, it is "necessary. 84
Recently, in In re Gregory,8 5 the bankruptcy court for the
Middle District of Tennessee had to decide the meaning of "necessary" as applied to a debtor's home in a Chapter 11 case. The
debtors in Gregory were wage earning consumers who filed for
Chapter 11 relief "to save our house." By filing under Chapter 11
rather than Chapter 13, the debtors hoped to propose a plan that
would restructure their home mortgage payments.8 6 Before a plan
was filed, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as
mortgage holder filed a motion requesting relief from the automatic stay. The debtors offered monthly payments of $500 to the
FDIC. The parties stipulated that the debtors had no equity in the
encumbered property, that the debtors offer of $500 monthly payments was adequate protection, and that comparable housing was
available for $350 a month. Under these facts, the bankruptcy
court held that the property was not necessary to an effective
reorganization.
In arriving at this holding, the Gregory court stated that
though residential property does not have to be directly related to
the production of income to be held "necessary" within the contemplation of section 362(d)(2), the debtor must nonetheless prove
a genuine need for the property. Thus, if the court finds that a
rented apartment meets the debtor's Chapter 11 needs, the house
81. Id. at 142.
82. See generally Zaretsky, Commentary, Some Limits on Mortgagees' Rights in
Chapter 13, 50 BROOKLYN L. REV. 433 (1984) (discussing two recent Second Circuit cases
concerning Chapter 13 debtors and secured mortgage creditors that have upheld a policy of
debtor protection); Comment, Home Foreclosures Under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act, 30 UCLA L. REv. 637 (1983) (exploring Chapter 13 home foreclosure issues).
83. See, e.g., In re Henderson, 21 Bankr. 285 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); In re Stewart, 11
Bankr. 93 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981); In re Roselli, 10 Bankr. 665 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
84. See, e.g., In re Million, 39 Bankr. 136 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984); In re Garner, 13
Bankr. 799 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd on other grounds, 18 Bankr. 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1982);
see also H. SOMMER, supra note 75, at 55-56.
85. 39 Bankr. 405 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984).
86. Section 1322(b)(2) of Chapter 13 forbids the modification of a "security interest in
real property that is the debtor's principal residence."

1985]

CHAPTERS 11 AND 13

is not necessary. The Gregory opinion requires that the bankruptcy court balance the costs and determine whether other living
arrangements are fungible with the debtor's needs.8 7
The Gregory approach of testing the debtor's minimum living
requirements arguably finds further support in a 1984 amendment
to Chapter 13-section 1325(b). Under this section, a Chapter 13
debtor who proposes a composition plan must commit all of her
"disposable income" to the repayment of prepetition debts.88 Forcing a Chapter 13 debtor to give up her home if there is a less costly
housing alternative increases the disposable income available to
satisfy creditors' claims.
While Gregory was not a Chapter 13 case, the court looked to
Chapter 13 case authority and seemed to suggest an approach to
use in both Chapter 13 and Chapter 11 consumer cases."" If "necessary" is to be given a different meaning in different kinds of
cases, it is more reasonable to classify cases on a "consumer
debtor/business debtor" basis rather than on a "Chapter 11 case/
Chapter 13 case" basis.
VI.

CLASSIFICATION OF "SUBSTANTIALLY

SIMILAR" CLAIMS

Both Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 have one critical point in
common: they both use a plan that determines the amount and
form of distribution to various creditors. Both chapters provide
that the plan can classify claims90 and pay some classes of claims
87. See 39 Bankr. at 411. The opinion provides:
This court believes that a debtor's home is necessary to an effective reorganization only
if the property is not fungible with other living arrangements meeting the debtor's
minimum living requirements. . . .Measuring fungibility against the debtor's minimum living requirements is consistent with the congressional use of the word "necessary" and allocates the burden to the debtors to demonstrate genuine need for the
property.
Id. (emphasis in original).
88. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
§ 317, 98 Stat. 333, 356 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)).
89. 39 Bankr. at 410. Some language in Riggs Nat'l Bank v. Perry, 729 F.2d 982, 985
(4th Cir. 1984), suggests that § 362(d) should apply only to "real property mortgage foreclosures." This suggestion is based on legislative history. For a concise, yet complete, consideration of the legislative history of § 362(d)(2), see Kennedy, Automatic Stays Under the New
Bankruptcy Law, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 3, 45-46"1978).
90. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1122, 1322(b)(1) (19S2). ee generally Anderson, Classification of
Claims and Interests in Reorganization Cases Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 58 A.
BANKR. L.J. 99 (1984) (discussing the development of concepts governing classification of
claims under prior reorganization law and relating their applicability to the 1978 Code);
Blair, Classificationof Unsecured Claims in Chapter 11 Reorganization,58 Am.BANK. L.J.
197 (1984) (formulating a standard of classification for § 1122); Epstein, Chapter 13: Its
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more and sooner than others. Cases under both chapters place secured claims in separate classes. Both chapters also require that
unsecured claims which are not "substantially similar" be placed
in different classes. Neither chapter, however, clearly indicates
whether unsecured claims that are "substantially similar" can be
placed in different classes. This part of the Article focuses on the
specific classification issue of the limits on a Chapter 11 or Chapter
13 debtor's discretion in placing unsecured claims in different classes. More specifically, when a debtor's plan provides for more than
one class of unsecured claims, whether it has to establish that the
unsecured claims in each of the classes are different somehow from
the unsecured claims in the other classes.
A. Differences in the Significance of Classification of Claims in
Chapter 11 and 13
While many classification characteristics and questions are
common to Chapters 11 and 13, the two chapters contain differences in the significance attached to the classification of claims. In
Chapter 11, the classification of claims can affect not only what
creditors receive under a plan but whether a plan can successfully
pass through the approval process contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code. Both creditors and the bankruptcy judge are involved
in this approval process.
Creditors of a Chapter 11 debtor receive a copy of a disclosure
statement containing "adequate information" about the plan. The
creditors then have the opportunity to vote on the plan. 1 To determine whether a sufficient number of creditors have accepted the
plan, the votes are counted by class--"two-thirds in amount and
more than one-half in number of the allowed claims of such
class. ' 92 If the requisite majority of the class accepts the plan, all

holders of claims within the class are bound by the vote.9 3 At least
one class of claims must vote to accept the plan. 4 When one class
accepts the plan but one or more classes dissent, the bankruptcy
Operation, Its Statutory Requirements as to Payment to and Classification of Unsecured
Claims, and Its Advantages, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (1980) (discussing the general operation of
Chapter 13); Given and Phillips, Equality in the Eye of the Beholder-Classificationof
Claims and Interests in Chapter 11 Reorganizations,43 OHIO ST. LJ. 735 (1982) (discussing
the criteria used for classifying claims within the context of corporate reorganization).
91. 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (1982).
92. Id. § 1126(c) (emphasis added).
93. Id. § 1141(a).
94. Id. § 1129(a)(10).
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judge may apply section 1129(b) and force the plan on the dissenting classes. Before effecting this "cram-down," the court must find
that the plan is "fair and equitable" with respect to each dissenting class and does not "discriminate unfairly" against any dissenting class.
In contrast, Chapter 13 creditors do not vote on the plan, and
the tests the judge applies in confirming a plan focus on individual
claims rather than classes of claims. Accordingly, classification has
a different and greater significance in Chapter 11 than in Chapter
13. In Chapter 11, and only Chapter 11, a debtor might try to classify claims to manipulate the creditor acceptance process. If a
Chapter 11 debtor, D, believes that creditors X and Y will reject
any plan that provides for less than full payment, D might try to
place X's claim and Y's claim in different classes and include a
sufficient number of "friendly creditors" in each class to meet the
approval standards of section 1126. This problem is unique to
Chapter 11.
B.

Code Provisions

As noted above, the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly deal
with the question of whether a Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 plan can
place similar unsecured claims in different classes.
Section 1122 governs classification in Chapter 11 plans. Section 1122(b) authorizes the segregation of all small claims into a
single class if "reasonable and necessary for administrative convenience. '1 5 Section 1122(a) provides the general test for determining
whether a claim can be included within a class: all claims within a
class must be "substantially similar" to other claims in that class.
Paragraph (a) does not provide any test for determining whether a
claim must be included within a class. No language in section 1122
limits the discretion of the drafter of the plan in placing "substantially similar" claims in different classes."e
95. Id. § 1122(b). Typically, a Chapter 11 plan provides for full cash payment of all
claims of X dollars or less. Thus, this class of claims is unimpaired by reason of § 1124(3)
and is conclusively presumed to have accepted the plan under § 1126(f). Furthermore,
§ 1126(0 excuses the debtor from sending disclosure statements to and soliciting plan acceptances from the creditors in that class.
96. To illustrate, assume that X, Y, and Z are creditors of Chapter 11 debtor, D. If D's
Chapter 11 plan places all three creditors' claims in the same class, § 1122(a) controls. It is
clear from § 1122(a) that D cannot place the claims of X, Y, Z in a single class unless all
three claims are "substantially similar"-whatever that means. If, however, D's Chapter 11
plan places each creditor's claim in a separate class, § 1122(a) does not control. What limits
D's discretion in placing claims in separate classes is not clear from § 1122(a).
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Section 1322 governs classification of unsecured claims in
Chapter 13 plans. Section 1322(b)(1) expressly incorporates section
1122 and adds the requirement that the plan "may not discriminate unfairly against any class so designated." Section 1122 contains no "discriminates unfairly" test. This phrase, however, does
appear in section 1129(b), but this "discriminates unfairly" test
97
only applies in Chapter 11 cases that have a dissenting class.
The effect of the "discriminates unfairly" test on a debtor's
discretion in placing "substantially similar" claims in different
classes raises a further question. If a debtor's Chapter 13 plan
places the claims of different unsecured creditors in different classes and provides for different treatment to each class, the plan is
obviously discriminatory with respect to these claims-is that level
of discrimination unfair?
C. Case Law Under the 1898 Act
Some legislative history suggests that claims classification
cases under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 will be helpful in answering claims classification questions under the Bankruptcy Code.
Section 1122 of the Bankruptcy Code is identical to section 1122 of
H.R. 8200. According to the House committee report that accompanied H.R. 8200, "[t]his section codifies current case law surrounding the classification of claims." 98
Chapter XIII of the 1898 Act was the predecessor to Chapter
13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Unfortunately, there is no case law
"surrounding the classification of claims" under Chapter XIII of
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 because Chapter XIII did not provide
for the classification of claims. Section 646 of the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898 required that the Chapter XIII plan deal with unsecured
claims "generally,"9 9 and "generally" was commonly interpreted to
require pro rata payment to all unsecured creditors.10 0
Chapters X, XI, and XII were the forerunners of Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code. Although each of these chapters permitted classification of claims, there was very little litigation or secondary writing about classification of claims. 0 1 Furthermore, each
97. See supra text following note 94.
98. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 406 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6363; see also S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 118 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5904.
99. 11 U.S.C. § 1046 (1976) (repealed 1978).
100. See 3 D. CowANs, BANKRuPTcy LAW AND PRACTICE § 1127, at 433 (2d ed. 1978).
101. See Note, Classification of Claims in Debtor Proceedings, 49 YALE L.J. 881
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of these chapters contained differences in their classification provisions that prevent them from being completely analogous to Chapter 11.
Section 197102 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 contained the
classification criteria for Chapter X and provided, in part: "For the
purposes of the plan and its acceptance, the judge shall fix the division of creditors and stockholders into classes according to the
nature of their respective claims and stock." 103 Section 197 of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, unlike section 1122 of the Bankruptcy
Code, gave the bankruptcy court independent power to designate
classes. The bankruptcy judge cannot classify claims under the
Bankruptcy Code. The present court's only control over classification of claims is to withhold confirmation under section 1129(a)(1)
when the classification in the plan does not comply with the applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Nonetheless, the general
operation of Chapter X was similar to Chapter 11. In Chapter X,
like Chapter 11, creditors voted by class on the plan;104 in Chapter
X, unlike Chapter 11, the court appointed a trustee in every
10 5
case.
Section 357(1) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which provided
the classification scheme for Chapter XI, stated that a Chapter XI
plan could include provisions for "the division of such debts into
classes and the treatment thereof in different ways or upon different terms."' 0 6 Section 357 thus omitted the "nature of their respective claims" language found in section 197. The general operation
of Chapter XI was similar to Chapter 11. In Chapter XI, like
Chapter 11, creditors voted on the plan by class;10 7 in Chapter XI,
unlike Chapter 11, only the debtor could propose or modify the
plan. 03 A Chapter XI debtor thus could negotiate for creditor approval of its plan on the basis of "accept on these terms or it's
liquidation."
Section 452 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which provided
the classification scheme for Chapter XII, permitted classification
of Chapter XII creditors "according to the nature of their respec(1940). For a complete discussion of the Bankruptcy Act classification cases, see Vihon,
Classification of Unsecured Claims: Squaring the Circle, 55 AM. BANKR.L.J. 113 (1978).
102. 11 U.S.C. § 597 (1976) (repealed 1978).
103. Id.
104. Id. § 579 (repealed 1978).
105. Id. § 556 (repealed 1978).
106. Id. § 757 (repealed 1978).
107. Id. § 762 (repealed 1978).
108. Id. § 706(1) (repealed 1978).
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tive claims." 10 9 Therefore, the Chapter XII classification language,
like the Chapter X classification language, included the "nature of
their respective claims" limitation. Chapter XII, however, could be
used only when the primary purpose of the reorganization was the
modification of the rights of creditors whose claims were secured
by real property: 110 accordingly, classification of unsecured claims
generally was not an issue in Chapter XII cases."1
None of the various statutory standards for classification of
claims under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 expressly deals with the
limits that govern a debtor's decision to separate claims into different classes. Reported decisions under the 1898 Act, however, do
speak to this issue. A number of these cases apply the test from
the early Bankruptcy Act case of In re Hudson-Ross, Inc.,1 12 -any
differences in treatment of unsecured claims must be just and reasonably necessary to effectuate the plan."1
In one of the last 1898 Act cases on classification, In re Winston Mills, Inc.," 4 the bankruptcy court followed a more liberal
approach to classification. The Winston Mills opinion describes
the classification process as a "product of delicate negotations taking place in the dialogue between a debtor and its creditors."1 1 5
The court reasoned that the requirement that a plan be accepted
by a statutory majority of the creditors in each class afforded the
separate classes sufficient protection. The court, however, specifically noted that the classification scheme was not invidious, thus
suggesting some minimum level of review was appropriate.11 The
Winston Mills opinion concludes with the observation that the
same approach to classification should and would be taken under
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. § 852 (repealed 1978).
Id. § 806 (repealed 1978).
NORTON, REAL PROPERTY ARRANGEMENTS 67-69 (1977).
175 F. Supp. 111, 112 (N.D. I1. 1959).
See, e.g., In re Discon Corp., 346 F. Supp. 839, 841 (S.D. Fla., 1971); In re Jaco

See generally W.

Fabrics, BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1301 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1978).
114. 1 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2D (MB) 121 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1979).
115. Id. at 127.
116. Id. at 128. The opinion provides:
What emerges plainly from the appraisal of the Chapter XI symmetry is that a debtor's
plan is the product of delicate negotiations taking place in the dialogue between a
debtor and its creditors .... It is not unknown, therefore, that a debtor will deal with
its trade creditors in one way, its union creditors in another, its institutional debt in
still another and so on. It is up to the debtor and all its creditors to decide the extent
to which the good graces of the trade creditors or the union will be needed if the rehabilitated debtor is to survive as a viable commercial entity....
Id. at 127-28.
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the Bankruptcy Code.11 7 While the court's reliance on negotiations
between the debtor and the creditor to control most classification
abuses arguably is appropriate in Chapter 11 cases, such reliance.
does not seem applicable to Chapter 13 cases. Because Chapter 13
has no provision for creditor voting, the plan in Chapter 13 cases is
far less likely to be the "product of delicate negotiations."
D. Case Law Under the Bankruptcy Code
Since the Bankruptcy Code became effective on October 1,
1979, few reported Chapter 11 cases have discussed the classification of unsecured claims issue. Several cases, however, denied confirmation of Chapter 11 plans because the plans placed unsecured
claims in separate classes. One circuit court also has offered some
dicta on this issue.
The plan in In re Mastercraft Record Plating,Inc.," 8 divided
unsecured claims into three classes: (1) claims under $20,000, (2)
claims over $20,000, and (3) disputed claims. The plan treated the
over $20,000 class and the under $20,000 class identically. In reviewing the adequacy of this plan, the court first found that the
classification scheme failed to meet the requirements of section
1122(b) because it did not pay in full the claims under $20,000.
The court next analyzed section 1122(a) and noted that its concern
with placing similar claims in the same class carried with it the
negative implication that similar claims normally should not be
placed in different classes. Because it viewed all general unsecured
claims as similar, the court denied confirmation of the plan. The
Mastercraft opinion concludes this analysis by stating: "Classification cannot be used to divide like claims into multiple classes in
order to create a consenting class so as to permit confirmation." 1 9
2
In In re S & W Enterprise,
the Chapter 11 plan placed all
unsecured claims of less than $1000 in a separate class. There were
two claims in this class; there was only one unsecured claim of
more than $1000. In rejecting confirmation of the plan, the court
focused on the "reasonable and necessary" requirement in section
1122(b). The court also noted by way of dictum that "the manipulation of unsecured claims . . . for the sole purpose of complying
with the voting requirement of section 1129(a)(10) shall not be
117. Id. at 128.
118. 32 Bankr. 106 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 39 Bankr. 654
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
119. 32 Bankr. at 108.

120.

11

BANKR. CT. DEC.

(CRR) 630 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984).
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'
tolerated."121

The First Circuit, in Granada Wines, Inc. v. New England
Teamsters and Trucking Industry Pension Fund,122 reviewed a
bankruptcy court's order requiring the Chapter 11 debtor to pay to
the appellee pension fund the same percentage as all other unsecured creditors. Although the plan had not placed the pension
fund claim in a separate class, the debtor argued that the claim
should be treated as if it were in a separate class and receive a
reduced payment. In rejecting this argument, the First Circuit considered when unsecured claims can be placed in separate classes.
Relying on case law under the 1898 Act, the court concluded: "Separate classifications for unsecured creditors are only justified
'where the legal character of their claims is such as to accord them
a status different from other unsecured creditors.' ,123
In Mastercraft, S & W, and Granada Wines, the courts were
concerned with classification being used to manipulate the creditor
voting requirements. In a sense, these cases present the easy classification issue-can a debtor base its classification on voting consideration.12 4 Clearly, a debtor should not be able to gerrymander
classification for voting purposes. (Remember that this will not be
an issue in Chapter 13 cases). What the limitations on classification of claims are when there is no vote manipulations issue or
concern remains unclear.
While there have only been a few reported Chapter 11 cases
on classification, there are numerous reported Chapter 13 cases.' 25
Two of the 1984 amendments to the Code, however, limit the precedential value of many of these cases. First, section 1322(b)(1) now
expressly and specifically empowers a debtor to place debts that
have a codebtor in a separate class. A Chapter 13 debtor who is
proposing something less than full payment on all unsecured debts
often will place any cosigned debts in a separate class and provide
for full payment to that class. The section 1301 automatic stay
against collection from codebtors on consumer debts is operative
only to the extent that the debt is to be paid under the plan. If the
121. Id. at 634.
122. 748 F.2d 42 (1st Cir. 1984).
123. Id. at 46 (quoting In re Los Angeles Land and Invs. Ltd., 282 F. Supp. 448, 454
(1968), aff'd, 447 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1971) (an example of such a claim is a tax claim)).
124. See generally Given & Phillips, supra note 90, at 735, 749-50 (arguing that courts
must consider the voting power of claimants when reviewing classification schemes).
125. See generally H. DRAKE & J. MORRIS, CHAPTER 13 PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 9.05 (1981).
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plan provides for less than full payment, the creditor may obtain
relief from the stay and proceed against the codebtor. Most of the
reported Chapter 13 classification cases concern debtor's efforts to
place cosigned debts in a separate class-a nonissue after the 1984
amendments.
Second, section 1325(b) now requires that a Chapter 13 debtor
who proposes a composition plan to her creditors commit all of her
disposable income to the Chapter 13 plan. This amendment addresses a concern of some segments of the consumer credit industry that debtors were obtaining the substantial benefits of Chapter
12 6
13 while making insubstantial payments to creditors.
Section 1325(b) probably will not prevent low or zero payment
plans to unsecured creditors in all cases. Unlike earlier proposals, 127 section 1325(b) focuses on the amount that the debtor keeps
for herself, rather than the amount that the creditor receives. If all
of a debtor's income were "necessary to be expended for the maintenance or support of the debtor," such a debtor would have no
disposable income and could file a zero payment plan and still
comply with section 1325(b).
Although section 1325(b) may not have the intended effect of
precluding Chapter 13 plans that propose low or no payment on
unsecured claims, it may have an unintended effect on the approach that some courts take to the classification of claims issue.
Previously, some court adopted the position that they should not
impose restrictions on the discretion exercised by a Chapter 13
debtor in classifying claims. These courts reasoned that so long as
a creditor receives as much as it would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation case, it cannot complain because other creditors are receiving more. 128 The courts derived this conclusion from section
1325(a)(4)'s requirement that creditors receive no less than the
amount they would have received under Chapter 7 before the court
could confirm a Chapter 13 plan.
Section 1325(b) undermines whatever limited validity this position had. Since in Chapter 13, a debtor is now statutorily obli126. Shortly after the Bankruptcy Code became effective, a number of bankruptcy
judges confirmed Chapter 13 plans that provided for low or no payments to unsecured
claims. See, e.g., In re Beaver, 2 Bankr. 337 (Bankr. S.D. Calif. 1980); In re Marlow, 3
Bankr. 305 (Bankr. N.D. I1. 1980).
127. See generally Ginsburg, The Bankruptcy Improvement Act-An Update, 3 N.
ILL. U. L. R.v. 235, 248 (1983).
128. See, e.g., In re Freeman, 28 Bankr. 74, 76 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1982), af'd sub
nom. Public Fin. Corp. v. Freeman, 28 Bankr. 77 (S.D. Miss.), aff'd in part, 712 F.2d 219
(5th Cir. 1983); In re Sutherland, 3 Bankr. 420, 422 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1980).
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gated to devote all of her disposable income to her plan, a creditor
is disadvantaged if another creditor receives a greater part of this
disposable income.
Even though the 1984 amendments affect the precedential
value of the holdings of many pre-1984 Chapter 13 classification
cases, the opinion in In re Kovich'2 9 and a number of later cases
suggest an approach to placing unsecured claims in separate classes that merits consideration in both Chapter 11 and Chapter 13
cases. When reviewing the debtor's classifications the court in Kovich considered the following four questions: (1) Is there a reasonable basis for the classification? (2) Is the debtor able to perform a
plan without the classification? (3) Has the debtor acted in good
faith in classifying claims? (4) How is the claim discriminated
against being treated?1 3 0 In essence, Kovich recognizes that the
classification of claims presents the classic balancing issue: benefit
versus detriment. Any bankruptcy court facing a classification issue should balance the extent to which the classification might
help the debtor perform under the plan against the extent to which
the classification disadvantages any class.

129.
130.

4 Bankr. 403 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1980).
Id. at 407.

